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LENDER LIABILITYIDUCIARY ISSUES
ADDRESSED IN THE SUPERFUND
REAUTHORIZATIONt
RICHARD A. HORSCH*
T IHUS far we have been discussing the broader aspects of
Superfund' and Superfund Reauthorization.2  I will discuss
Superfund and Superfund Reauthorization from the more focussed
viewpoint of lenders. I would like first to talk about what lender lia-
bility is: what we by "lender liability" and, frankly, what we do not
mean. Second, I will like to review how lenders can be held liable;
where the case law has taken us; and where EPA, in its attempts to
clarify the area, has taken us. Finally, I will examine what the pro-
posed Reauthorization Bill will do, and what it will not do to clarify
the uncertainty of lender liability under CERCLA.
The first question, what is lender liability and what is it not, helps to
establish the boundaries of this discussion. CERCLA3 creates essen-
tially three risks to lenders. The first risk is a basic credit problem. If
a borrower's property is contaminated and the borrower is spending
enormous amounts of money to clean it up, the borrower may not
have enough money to pay back the loan. However, such a credit risk
is not "lender liability," as that term is used here. It is a risk that
CERCLA imposes on lenders, but it is not a risk of direct liability.
The second risk occurs when a lender has a security interest in real
property If that real property turns out to be contaminated, what was
earlier thought to be a piece of collateral with positive value may turn
out to have a negative value, because under CERCLA it is not un-
common for the clean-up costs to exceed the value of the property.
The loss of value, or "impairment of collateral" is a risk CERCLA
imposes on lenders, but it is not direct lender liability as we are using
the term here.4
The risk that lenders are most concerned with, and the one that
lenders hope will be adequately addressed in Reauthorization is the
t This speech was presented at the Fordham Symposium, Superfund
Reauthonzation: Agenda for the 90's, held at Fordham University School of Law on
March 11, 1994.
* Partner, White & Case, New York; B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1974;
J.D., New York Umversity, 1980.
1. Superfund Amendments and Reauthonzation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter Superfund]. Superfund amended the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. Special Report, INSIDE EPA'S SUPERFUND REPORT, Jan. 14, 1993, at 1, 5.
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risk imposed by direct lender liability.' This liability is created where
a lender, by virtue of the fact that it has a security interest m property,
and "participates in the management of property," however that
phrase may be defined, may be held liable for the direct clean-up cost
of that property, regardless of whether the lender caused the contami-
nation.6 Let me give you an example. A lender may have a million
dollar loan outstanding, but under the statute could become liable for
a $10 million clean-up. It is this direct liability of lenders for clean-up
costs that lenders are most concerned with, and the problem that we
hope Reauthorization will address.
To understand how a lender might be held liable, one must under-
stand how CERCLA works.7 Under CERCLA, liability is deter-
mined not only by virtue of actions or wrongdoing, but in many
instances, merely by status.' "Owners and operators" of facilities are
deemed liable for any contamination of the property 9 Prior owners
and operators of the facility are liable for hazardous substances or
hazardous waste that were disposed of at the time that they owned or
operated the facility.10
What is an "owner" and "operator"? CERCLA includes a long list
of definitions at the beginning of the statute and it defines "owner"
and "operator" as follows: "the term 'owner or operator' means ... in
the case of a . . facility, any person owning or operating such facility
... ,,11 The definition is circular. This lack of clarity goes back to
what Bill White was talking about in terms of how quickly CERCLA
was enacted,' 2 and in my opinion, in some instances, how poorly it was
drafted.
Although the statute does not define what an owner and operator
is, it does define what an owner and operator is not. The Statute does
so through CERCLA's secured creditor exemption. 13
Through that exemption, Congress carved out an exemption for "a
person, who, without participating in the management of a... facility,
holds [indicia of ownership] primarily to protect a security interest in
5. Id.
6. Id.
7 42 U.S.C. § 9601-75 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988).
12. William A. White, Reauthorization Overview: EPA's Perspective, 5 Fo.-HAM
ErvTL. LJ. 299 (1994). See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355,363 (1986)(CER-
CLA is "not a model of legislative draftsmanship."); U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The Statute is riddled with inconsistencies and
redundancies."); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle City, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir.
1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. Problems of interpre-
tation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms, a difficulty par-
ticularly apparent in the response costs area.").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
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that facility.' 1 4 It is not a particularly clear exemption. Apparently,
Congress was looking to the courts to clarify the exemption through
case law
Early cases after CERCLA enactment grappled with many issues.
Those issues included, for example, whether foreclosing on property
voids the exemption. Other issues included such questions as what
factors determine participation in management? Does it mean partici-
pating in the financial management of a company, something that
banks get involved with from time-to-time? Particularly in "work-
out" situations? Or does it require something more than that? Does
"participation in management" require actual participation in the op-
erations of the facility? Or must the lender become involved in the
day-to-day operations of the facility? What about "mere ability to
control" the operations of the borrower, is that sufficient?
The results of cases decided through 1990 were not consistent. In
1990, the infamous Fleet Factors case was decided. 15 Fleet Factors was
an example of a case where bad facts make bad law. Based on the
facts of Fleet Factors, it is understandable why the court held the bank
liable for contamination on the property. However, the decision of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is poorly worded. There is a
great deal of ambiguity in the language. Different commentators have
read the decision to mean different things. Some courts have read it
to mean that actions prior to foreclosure can trigger lender liability
Other commentators have read the decision to mean that mere partic-
ipation in the financial affairs of a borrower (something a lender
might do in a work-out) can be deemed "participation in manage-
ment," and trigger lender liability.'6
Some commentators have read Fleet Factors as even more troub-
ling, pointing to language in the case that implies that the mere "ca-
pacity to control" the hazardous waste practices of the borrower can
trigger lender liability.' 7 In reality, of course, nearly any lender has
the ability to control a borrower, or its hazardous waste decisions.
Any loan can be premised and conditioned on certain practices by the
14. Id.
15. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
16. The speaker later provided additional insight into the circumstances leading to
this situation:
The lenders are in a kind of Catch 22. When the borrower begins to exhibit
financial instability, lenders may assist the borrower to meet payments by
becoming more involved in financial issues. To the extent that this happens,
at least in some circuits, they take the risk of crossing the line and becoming
liable for environmental impairment.
Certainly the Fleet Factors case is probably the most important case that
has been read to hold that participation in financial management is sufficient
to void the secured creditor exemption. Again, the facts in Fleet Factors
showed more than participation in financial management.
17. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556-58.
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borrower. In fact, most loan agreements with commercial or indus-
trial establishments today require the borrower to comply in all re-
spects with environmental laws; for example, they are required to
dispose of its hazardous waste appropriately, etc. According to some
commentators who read Fleet Factors broadly, if a bank has that con-
trol, it may be enough to trigger lender liability '8
After Fleet Factors, significant efforts were made to clarify this very
ambiguous area of CERCLA liability. Whether one agrees that these
differing interpretations of Fleet Factors are warranted, it is clear that
the ruling and language of the case created a great deal of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is not something bankers like. Bankers are a conserva-
tive lot: they tend to dress conservatively, and they think conserva-
tively Bankers, as most businesspersons, do not like uncertainty.
Bills were introduced in Congress. Rather than support Congres-
sional action, however, EPA stepped in and through its rulemaking
authority, attempted to eliminate some of the uncertainties. During a
one and one half to two year period, EPA prepared and circulated
various drafts of what became known as the EPA Lender Liability
Rule.19 Ultimately, in the spring of 1992, EPA issued its final Lender
Liability Rule.2 °
The rule was intended to provide a safe harbor for banks. It set
forth the actions a secured creditor could take and could not take dur-
ing the different stages of the borrowing relationship - from the
stage prior to making the loan to foreclosure after default.2' For ex-
ample, it explained whether or not the lender could "police" the haz-
ardous waste practices of its borrower.' The rule attempted to clarify
the actions a lender could and could not take during "work-out" -
when the loan relationship has gone bad and loan payments are no
longer being made.23 The rule even determined what a bank could
and could not do even after foreclosure and whether a lender could
foreclose on property without triggering lender liability.24
Shortly after its final promulgation, the rule was challenged in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In early February of this year, the
Court of Appeals, in Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. EPA,.' vacated the
lender liability rule, because, according to the court, EPA lacked au-
18. See generally Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, To Lend or Not to Lend
- That Should Not Be the Question: The Uncertainty of Lender Liability Under CER-
CLA, 41 DUKE L.J. 1211, 1225 (1992).
19. EPA Lender Liability Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
20. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,382 (1992)(codified as 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992)).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(l)-(2) (1992).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(A) (1992).
23. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1992).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(1)-(3) (1992).
25. Kelley ex reL Michigan v. EPA, Nos. 92-1312, 92-1314, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
1715 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 1994).
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thonty to issue the rule.26 The court suggested that if lenders or EPA
wanted the relief provided by the rule, they should look to Congress.27
Ironically, the case came down one day after the Administration
Superfund Reauthorization Bill was submitted.
Where do lenders go from here? Certainly, in the courts, lenders
and EPA will likely seek rehearing, possibly rehearing en banc, before
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. More importantly,
lenders will look more seriously to Congress for clarification through
the Reauthorization Bill.a
In fact, the Reauthorization Bill does address the lender liability
issue. The Bill does not provide much detail, at least the version of
the Bill that was presented on February 4th. It states only that "au-
thority to promulgate regulations to define the terms of this Act
(CERCLA) as they apply to lenders and other financial services prov-
iders and other fiduciaries," etc., is confirmed by the section.2 9 In
other words, the Reauthorization Bill attempts to provide EPA with
the authority to promulgate regulations that the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals said it lacked authority to promulgate. That
is, to define the specific terms of CERCLA (the term "owner-opera-
tor"), and thereby clarify the secured creditor exemption.3
Will the language m the Administration's Bill be sufficient? I do
not believe so. A careful reading of Kelley reveals that the court be-
lieved EPA was doing more than merely defimng the terms of the
statute. What EPA was attempting to do, according to the court, was
to define liability, and to expand or contract the scope of the statute
and its liability scheme.3 ' That, according to the court, is not EPA's
responsibility. It is the responsibility of Congress.32
EPA does not define statutory terms, "but rather takes off from
those terms, and devises a comprehensive regulatory regime to ad-
dress the liability problems facing secured creditors. '33 This is an ex-
tensive quasi-legislative effort and not merely the construction of
statutory phrases that the court noted m other cases.34
According to the court then, it may not be enough for Congress,
through Reauthorization, to reiterate EPA's authority to define the
terms of the statute.
26. Id. at *2.
27 Id.
28. S. 1834.
29. Id. § 407.
30. See id.
31. Kelley, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1715, at *23-25.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *24.
34. Id., citing National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sul-
livan, 979 F.2d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d
464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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What impact does the uncertainty have, not just on lenders, but on
the rest of us? Certainly there is a greater hesitancy on the part of
lenders to extend credit to borrowers who have serious risks of envi-
ronmental contamination. The uncertainty has also added to the
transaction costs, particularly for industrial property.
In addition, the potential liability exacerbates the problem noted by
Bill White:35 the tendency of the present CERCLA liability scheme
to drive industry away from potentially contaminated property. Some
of the properties are not really a threat to human health and safety.
Rather, it is the fear of the unknown that will drive lenders away from
making loans on urban sites that may be contaminated.
Where does the law stand without the EPA rule? Lenders must
look to existing case law In the Eleventh Circuit, Fleet Factors is still
the rule. In the Ninth Circuit, the cases are a little bit better, and
there is better clarification. The First Circuit has good clarification.
In many other circuits, however, the liability issues have not been ad-
dressed. Lawyers advising lenders must look at the law and determine
how to advise the lender about the liability in a particular district, in a
particular circuit. Oftentimes, the answers are unclear; sometimes
there is no case law guidance.
Just a brief word on fiduciary liability Typically fiduciary liability
arises where you have a trustee. This is very similar to lender liability.
A trustee, in most states, by operation of law, is required to hold title
to the property as opposed to the trust itself. If the trustee holds title
to the property for the benefit of the trust, or for the benefit of the
beneficiary, can that trustee or the financial institution be deemed an
"owner" 9
The secured creditor exemption generally would not apply because
typically a trustee does not hold its indicia of ownership to protect a
security interest. The trustee holds title because as a trustee, title is
held for the benefit of the beneficiary.
Although the case law in this area is sparse, it makes clear that in
many cases a trustee will be considered an owner. Then the question
becomes, if a trustee is an owner, can the trustee be held liable to an
amount greater than the trust assets? There are cases, particularly the
Phoenix case, decided in the district of Arizona,36 which say that
under certain circumstances, a trustee, a fiduciary, can be deemed lia-
ble, and that liability can exceed the value of the trust assets.37
The Reauthorization proposal does address the issue of fiduciary
liability. 8 The proposal attempts to fix this problem the same way
Congress initially fixed the issue concerning lenders. The proposal
states that an owner and operator does not include a trustee who
35. White, supra note 12, at 307.
36. City of Phoenx v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F Supp. 600 (D. Amz. 1993).
37. Id. at 605.
38. S. 1834 § 605(d)(4)(E)(i)-(ii).
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holds title solely in a capacity as a fiduciary, providing the trustee does
not participate m the management of the vessel or facility.
If the Reauthorization "fix" is ultimately enacted, fiduciaries will be
in the same position that lenders were several years ago. The same
question will arise: what does it mean to participate m the manage-
ment of a facility? Does that mean, for example, the mere ability to
participate? Where is the line that a trustee cannot cross? This con-
cludes my discussion on lender and fiduciary issues. I thank you for
your time.

